Creatix / February 20, 2026
February 20, 2026 was a historic day in our constitutional republic. The Supreme Court invalidated the tariffs imposed by the Executive Power. Regardless of where you may stand on the issue, the decision reinforces the separation of powers under our Constitution.
The decision is known as Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (consolidated with Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc.), delivered February 20, 2026: (Supreme Court)
Case Background
The Court considered whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose broad tariffs during a declared national emergency. (Supreme Court)
Former President Trump used IEEPA to impose sweeping import tariffs (“Liberation Day” and other duties) in 2025. (Wikipedia)
Multiple businesses and states challenged those tariffs as beyond presidential authority. (Wikipedia)
Issues Before the Court
The Supreme Court addressed two consolidated cases:
Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs of unlimited scope, amount, and duration. (Supreme Court)
What should happen to the lower-court judgments in light of that conclusion. (Supreme Court)
Holding (Final Decision)
The Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. (Supreme Court)
The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate … importation” does not include tariff-imposing power. (Supreme Court)
The judgment in Learning Resources was vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because that case reached the Supreme Court before final judgment below. (Supreme Court)
The judgment in V.O.S. Selections was affirmed. (Supreme Court)
Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Roberts)
Core Reasoning
Tariff power is a legislative power under Article I of the Constitution: only Congress may “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” (Supreme Court)
IEEPA’s general authority to “regulate … importation” does not clearly and expressly delegate to the President the power to levy taxes/tariffs. (Supreme Court)
The Government conceded the President has no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime, meaning the attempt to use IEEPA was the only basis. (Supreme Court)
Prior precedents (e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan) do not support interpreting IEEPA to encompass tariffs. (Supreme Court)
Support for the Ruling
The majority stressed the Framers’ decision to vest taxing powers solely in Congress. (Supreme Court)
The opinion underscores that broad, economically impactful policies like tariffs require clear congressional authorization. (Supreme Court)
Opinions Within the Majority
Justice Kagan (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson) agreed IEEPA does not authorize tariffs but would rely less on the so-called major questions doctrine and more on traditional statutory interpretation. (Justia Law)
Justices Gorsuch and Barrett also wrote concurrences, joined by some in the majority, reaching similar holdings through differing emphases. (Supreme Court)
Dissent (Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito)
The dissent argued that “regulate … importation” should be interpreted to include tariffs, noting that quotas and embargoes affect imports and tariffs are a less intrusive regulatory tool. (Supreme Court)
Under this view, IEEPA’s broad language (historically linked to tariff-related actions) could authorize such measures. (Justia Law)
The dissent expressed concern that the majority’s interpretation unnecessarily limits executive flexibility during declared emergencies. (Supreme Court)
Significance of the Ruling
The decision clarifies that tariffs cannot be imposed by the executive alone under IEEPA; explicit statutory authority from Congress is required. (Supreme Court)
It reaffirms constitutional separation of powers by protecting Congress’s exclusive taxing authority. (Supreme Court)
The ruling may trigger litigation and refund claims for tariffs collected under IEEPA, though the ruling itself did not directly resolve refund mechanisms. (Wikipedia)
Majority Reasoning
Roberts’ opinion is the Court’s opinion, except for Part II–A–2 (major questions) and Part III. (Supreme Court)
Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson join Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B (the core constitutional structure + statutory interpretation holding). (Supreme Court)
Part II–A–2 (major questions doctrine) is written by Roberts joined only by Gorsuch and Barrett (a 3-Justice section). (Supreme Court)
So the binding core of the decision is: (1) Congress holds the taxing/tariff power; (2) IEEPA’s text does not clearly delegate tariff power; (3) therefore, no tariffs under IEEPA. (Supreme Court)
1) First principles: tariffs are a core Article I taxing power, not an inherent executive power
The Court starts from constitutional structure: Article I gives Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” and the Court treats tariffs as plainly part of that taxing power. (Supreme Court)
It emphasizes that the President has no inherent peacetime power to impose tariffs (the Government conceded that), meaning the tariffs stand or fall solely on whether IEEPA authorizes them. (Supreme Court)
2) The Government’s reading is “two words can’t bear that weight”
The Court frames the Government’s argument as resting on two words in §1702(a)(1)(B)—“regulate” and “importation”—and says that reading would give the President power to impose tariffs “on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time,” which the Court rejects as too much to squeeze from that text. (Supreme Court)
3) Statutory interpretation (the core holding): IEEPA does not mention tariffs—and “regulate” does not mean “tax”
A. Textual silence where you’d expect specificity
IEEPA gives the President a long list of powers—“investigate, block…, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit… importation or exportation”—but the Court stresses: no “tariffs,” no “duties.” Given how consequential tariff power is, the Court says Congress would have said so explicitly if it meant to grant it. (Supreme Court)
B. Ordinary meaning + ordinary statutory usage: “regulate” ≠ “tax”
The Court leans on ordinary usage and broader statutory practice: many laws authorize agencies to “regulate” things, but that does not imply a power to tax those things. It points out the Government couldn’t identify a statute where “regulate” alone carries taxing authority, and uses an example: even though the SEC can “regulate” securities trading, it can’t therefore tax trading. (Supreme Court)
The Court’s logic: taxes can have regulatory effects, but it doesn’t follow that a general regulatory grant includes the distinct revenue power. When Congress means to grant both, it typically does so separately and expressly. (Supreme Court)
C. Constitutional-avoidance pressure: IEEPA covers “exportation,” and export taxes are unconstitutional
IEEPA’s clause covers “importation or exportation.” The Court notes that taxing exports is constitutionally forbidden, so reading “regulate … exportation” to include “tax” would push IEEPA into unconstitutional territory—another reason the Court resists reading “regulate” as “tax.” (Supreme Court)
D. “Neighboring words” canon: the verbs around “regulate” look like control/sanctions tools, not revenue tools
The Court uses a noscitur-a-sociis style point: “regulate” sits among verbs like block, prohibit, nullify, etc.—tools that control transactions and property, not raise revenue. Presidential practice under IEEPA has used those sanction-like tools; no President has treated IEEPA as a revenue-raising statute. (Supreme Court)
4) Historical practice: half a century of IEEPA use with no tariffs
The Court treats historical nonuse as probative: in IEEPA’s “half century of existence,” no President invoked it to impose tariffs, even though Presidents regularly invoked IEEPA for other purposes and used other statutes to impose tariffs on specific goods. (Supreme Court)
It also discusses the one commonly cited “pre-IEEPA” episode involving Nixon-era measures under IEEPA’s predecessor (TWEA) and characterizes it as limited and not a stable foundation for reading IEEPA as a broad peacetime tariff statute. (Supreme Court)
5) The Court rejects the Government’s precedent and “statutory lineage” arguments
The Government tried to build a bridge from wartime / older authorities and scattered history to IEEPA. The Court says that chain relies on attenuated inferences and cannot supply the clear support needed for a power as extraordinary as tariffs. (Supreme Court)
It also distinguishes Algonquin (Trade Expansion Act §232): that statute contains different text and context—including express reference to “duties” elsewhere and a broader “take such action… as he deems necessary” formulation—so the Court refuses to treat Algonquin as meaning IEEPA authorizes tariffs. (Supreme Court)
6) Major Questions Doctrine section (Roberts + Gorsuch + Barrett only)
Although not joined by a majority of the Court, Roberts’ Part II–A–2 offers an additional rationale: when the Executive claims extraordinary economic power on ambiguous text, the Court is reluctant to infer it, especially where the claimed delegation touches Congress’s power of the purse. (Supreme Court)
Key points in that section:
Congress historically delegates tariff power explicitly and with procedural constraints, which cuts against finding sweeping tariff authority in IEEPA’s general wording. (Supreme Court)
The claimed IEEPA authority would be a “transformative expansion” and allow “dizzying” tariff modifications after a declared emergency, which the Government said is effectively unreviewable and can only be stopped by Congress with a veto-proof path. (Supreme Court)
The Court rejects arguments for an “emergency” carve-out (quoting Youngstown’s warning that emergency powers “tend to kindle emergencies” and noting many IEEPA emergencies persist for decades). (Supreme Court)
The Court also rejects a “foreign affairs exception” for tariffs: the President and Congress do not share constitutional tariff power in peacetime, so foreign-affairs context does not justify reading vague language as a relinquishment of Congress’s exclusive taxing authority. (Supreme Court)
7) Jurisdiction disposition (why one case is vacated/dismissed)
Separate from the merits, the Court agrees that challenges like these fall within the Court of International Trade’s exclusive jurisdiction because they arise from tariff schedule modifications; therefore, the D.C. district court lacked jurisdiction in Learning Resources, so that judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Supreme Court)
Bottom line
Tariffs are Congress’s taxing instrument; IEEPA’s text and structure do not clearly hand that instrument to the President; historical practice confirms the absence of such authority; therefore, IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. (Supreme Court)
Why Some Fear The Supreme Court's Tariff Decision May Push War
The Court repeatedly framed tariffs as a power Congress holds “during peacetime,” and it rejected the idea that “emergency” language (like IEEPA) is a free pass for huge shifts in economic policy without clear congressional authorization. (Supreme Court)
Why the ruling sparks the “war incentive” worry
1) The opinion draws a bright “peacetime” line around tariff authority
The majority says the Constitution assigns tariff/taxing power to Congress, and it emphasizes that “Congress alone” has the tariff power “during peacetime,” noting the Government conceded the President has no inherent peacetime tariff authority. (Supreme Court)
That phrasing can make people think: If peacetime is the obstacle, does wartime change the legal landscape?
2) Wartime historically comes with different statutory toolkits
Even though the Court is deciding IEEPA (a peacetime emergency statute), readers know the U.S. has other authorities tied to war or wartime conditions (and historically, broader executive economic controls are sometimes associated with wartime regimes).
So the fear is: if the executive strongly wants tariff-like leverage but can’t get it under IEEPA, it might look for a legal environment where power is broader—i.e., “wartime.” (That’s the “incentive” argument.)
3) The Court denies an “emergency exception”
Roberts (joined by Gorsuch and Barrett in that section) explicitly says there’s no special carve-out from the “major questions” principle just because the statute is an emergency statute. (Supreme Court)
That can sound to critics like: If even emergencies don’t justify sweeping unilateral economic moves, leaders may seek an even bigger justification.
Why this “push to war” theory seems overstated (hopefully)
A) War doesn’t magically transfer Congress’s taxing power to the President
Even if wartime expands what the Executive can do in some domains, tariffs are still “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”—the Court treats that as core Article I territory. (Supreme Court)
So the “go to war to get tariff power” idea runs into a basic problem: war doesn’t rewrite Article I. In practice, a President would still generally need statutory authorization.
B) Courts are skeptical of “manufactured necessity”
The Court’s framing is suspicious of “big-time policy calls” being made on vague text, and it notes the absence of historical precedent for using IEEPA this way. (Supreme Court)
That general posture makes it harder (not easier) to defend sweeping economic actions based on thin legal theories—including any move that looks like a pretext to unlock powers.
C) The Executive has non-war alternatives for trade pressure
News coverage of the decision notes the administration can pursue other statutes (e.g., Section 232 for national security tariffs, Section 301, etc.), and that some tariffs (like certain steel/autos under other authorities) remain in place. (Investopedia) That should reduce any “need” to chase extraordinary conditions such as war.
D) War is politically and strategically costly
Even if a legal theorist can imagine marginal incentives, the real-world cost of war (domestic, international, economic, human) is so massive that it’s not a plausible “workaround” for trade authority.
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